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THE FREE SPEECH-FAIR TRIAL CONTROVERSY:
DR 7-107
A lawyer's right to free speech' and a litigant's right to a fair and
impartial tria 2 may conflict during different stages of civil or criminal
litigation. An extra-judicial statement by a lawyer may influence the im-
partiality of either type of judicial proceeding.3 Restrictions on the freedom
The right to free speech is guaranteed by the first amendment, which states in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2 The sixth amendment, which guarantees an impartial trial to a criminal defendant,
states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
The Constitution also guarantees litigants in a civil proceeding the right to a fair and
impartial proceeding. The seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil
suits. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Such a guarantee implies that the jury will be impartial.
Moreover, the Supreme Court requires that judicial decisions, both civil and criminal, be
made in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 350-51 (1966). The right to a jury trial is meaningless unless the decision rendered in
the courtroom is an impartial one. See id. at 362.
1 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (justice requires that the decision
in a judicial conflict results from evidence and argument in open court); Patterson v. Colo-
rado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (outside influences, whether private talk or public print, must
not effect the outcome of a trial).
Two cases illustrate the conflict between the constitutional rights of the lawyer and the
litigant. In 1933, Bruno Richard Hauptman was tried and convicted for the kidnap and
murder of the Lindburgh baby. The publicity surrounding the trial was extensive. Hallam,
Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REV. 453,454 (1940). Forty-
five direct telegraph wires serviced approximately 700 newspapermen covering the trial mak-
ing it possible for information concerning the trial to reach the major capitals of the world.
Id.
Recognizing the opportunity for publicity, the prosecution and defense organized public
relations campaigns. Id. at 460. Defense counsel made public statements concerning the
innocence of his client, detailing plans for the defense, and promising future "bombshells"
and surprises. The prosecuting attorney also took his case to the media by holding daily press
conferences. The Hauptman trial was subsequently characterized as "perhaps the most
spectacular and depressing example of improper publicity and professional misconduct ever
presented to the people of the United States in a criminal trial." Id. at 454 (quoting ABA
SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLICITY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1936)).
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), is a more recent example of the conflict
between the rights of lawyer and litigant. Although Dr. Sam Sheppard was convicted of the
murder of his wife, see 165 Ohio St. 293, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956), the Supreme Court granted
his federal habeas corpus application because publicity resulting from extensive newspaper
and television coverage denied him a fair trial. 384 U.S. at 335. The extent of this coverage
is evident from the fact that the court conducted an inquest before trial in a high school
gymnasium, which was broadcast live on television. Id. at 339. Throughout the trial, the
prosecution repeatedly made inadmissible evidence available to the press. Id. at 360. The
Court stated that a "carnival atmosphere," id. at 358, prevailed to the extent that "bedlam
reigned at the courthouse." Id. at 355.
Not every criminal proceeding attracts the attention received by these two cases. How-
ever, national attention is not required before a lawyer must question whether to speak and
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to make extra-judicial statements are both necessary and constitutionally
permissible to avoid prejudice to the fair administration of justice.' Abso-
lute restrictions on the lawyer's freedom of speech, however, are not consti-
tutionally permissible to insure an impartial trial.
5
The American Bar Association (ABA) drafted Disciplinary Rule 7-107
(DR 7-107) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility' as a compro-
mise to the conflict between the constitutional rights of tile lawyer and the
litigant.7 DR 7-1071 specifically delineates topics on which lawyers may not
risk prejudice to a pending trial. Local media coverage alone can create the potential for such
prejudice.
The Supreme Court specifically recognizes that the guarantee of free speech contained
in the first amendment is not absolute. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570
(1976); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
394 (1950). Moreover, restrictions on the freedom of discussion are clearly permissible for the
purpose of protecting the fair and orderly administration of justice. Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946). Justice will not allow lawyers, by extra-judicial statements, to
frustrate the court's function of rendering impartial adjudication. See Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
1 A restriction on the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment must be no greater
than is essential to protect the particular governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). More specifically, a first amendment restriction must be neither
overbroad nor vague. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (an overbroad proscrip-
tion prohibits comment that poses no threat to a fair and impartial trial). Vagueness encom-
passes the situation where the prohibitions of free speech are not defined clearly so that the
lawyer is not given adequate notice of proscribed comment. See Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Overbroad and vagde prohibitions facilitate arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement because there are no standards to guide the application of the
prohibition. Such prohibitions also suppress more speech than necessary because the indefi-
niteness of the prohibition causes the lawyer to avoid the area of comment for which he may
be subject to sanction. See id. at 109.
1 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsImIrT, DR 7-107; see notes 9-10 infra. The problem
of prejudicial publicity caused by extra-judicial statements is not novel. Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke stated that nothing is more destructive to an impartial trial than to prejudice the
public's mind against parties to a lawsuit before the case is heard. Portman, The Defense of
Fair Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative
Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 395 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Benign Neglect].
However, the prejudicial publicity problem did not reach alarming proportions until the
twentieth century when advances in media technology increased both the speed and scope of
news dissemination. Benign Neglect, supra at 396; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 548-49 (1976); note 3 supra.
DR 7-107 is not the American Bar Association's (ABA's) first attempt to deal with extra-
judicial comment. Canon 20 of the old ABA Canons of Professional Ethics prohibited newspa-
per publications by a lawyer regarding pending or anticipated litigation because such publica-
tions interfered with a fair trial. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
80 n.2 (App. Draft 1968)[hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT].
7 Spurred by the trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard, see note 3 supra, and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, the ABA created an advisory committee to deal with the problem
of a fair trial and a free press. Both of these events underscored the pervasive influence that
extra-judicial statements can have on the administration of justice. For example, grave doubt
existed whether Lee Harvey Oswald could have received an impartial trial given the massive
publicity concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
FREE SPEECH-FAIR TRIAL
comment during the pendency of a criminal9 or civil proceeding.'" The
proscription of speech applies only when such comment presents a reasona-
COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDNT KENNEDY 238 (1964).
The advisory committee's findings and recommendations were published in the Reardon
Report. These recommendations became sections (A) through (D) of DR 7-107. ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrY, DR 7-107 n.85; see note 9 infra.
8 Disciplinary Rules, along with Canons and Ethical Considerations, comprise the three
parts of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The.Canons express general standards
of professional conduct expected of lawyers. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILMY, PRE-
LIMINARY STATEMENT. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in nature and represent the
ideals to which every lawyer should strive. Id. Disciplinary Rules dictate the mandatory
minimum level of acceptable conduct by lawyers. Id. Failure to comply with a Disciplinary
Rule may subject a lawyer to disciplinary action. Id.
I DR 7-107's prohibitons only cover extra-judicial statements that a reasonable person
would expect some form of public communication media to disseminate. Sections (A) through
(E) of DR 7-107 apply to criminal proceedings. DR 7-107(A), dealing with the investigatory
stage of the criminal process, prohibits statements that do more than state:
(1) Information contained in the public record;
(2) That the investigation is in progress;
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense and,
if permitted by law, the identity of the victim;
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters
and the information necessary thereto; or
(5) A warning to the public of any danger.
DR 7-107(B) deals with the criminal process from the initiation of proceedings until the
commencement of trial. This section prohibits statements that relate to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, indict-
ments, or other charges of crime) of the accused;
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense;
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by
the accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement;
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of the accused to submit to examinations or tests;
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness; or
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the
merits of the case.
DR 7-107(D) deals with the period during jury selection and the trial itself. This section
prohibits statements that relate to the trial, the parties, the issues, or "other matters that
are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial." DR 7-107(E) prohibits any statement that
is "reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence" during the period between the
completion of trial and the imposition of sentence.
The Reardon Report, see notes 6-7 supra, did not contain any recommendation re-
garding civil trials. However, DR 7-107(G) does address the problem of prejudicial comment
during a civil trial. This section prohibits statements that relate to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved;
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective
witness;
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of a party to submit to such;
(4) [The attorney's] opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party,
except as required by law or administrative rule; or
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
19801
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ble likelihood of prejudice to the fair administration of justice.1 All other
topics are free for discussion.2 This precise proscription is an attempt to
insure that the restrictions of comment in DR 7-107 are no broader than
necessary to protect the impartiality of litigation. 3 Two recent circuit
court decisions, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer4 and Hirschkop v.
Snead,5 examined the constitutionality of DR 7-107's restrictions on the
attorney's first amendment right to free speech.
In Bauer, an association of Chicago lawyers and several of its members
sought injunctive and declaratory relief from the application of DR 7-107
by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois." The plaintiffs
argued that DR 7-107 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad" because
the application of the disciplinary rule is not limited to situations present-
ing a clear and present danger of a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice." The prevention of extra-judicial comment pos-
ing only a reasonable likelihood of prejudice to a fair trial," according to
the plaintiffs, is an unconstitutional abridgement of an attorney's first
amendment rights."
The Seventh Circuit, in Bauer, agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that
DR 7-107's proscriptions only apply to an attorney's comments that pose
a serious and imminent threat2' to the fair administration of justice during
" See notes 9-10 supra. See also Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365, 367 (4th Cir.
1979). But see Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975).
2 See notes 9-10 supra.
13 The proscriptions of DR 7-107 are open to constitutional attack because of over-
breadth if the disciplinary rule prohibits more speech than is necessary to protect the impar-
tiality of a trial. See note 5 supra.
" 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
" 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
" 522 F.2d at 247. Relief in Bauer was sought from both Rule 1.07 of the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois' Local Criminal Rules and DR 7-107. Id. The local rule
incorporates DR 7-107 into the local rules of court. Id. at 247 n.2.
Courts are competent to make and enforce reasonable rules for the attorneys that appear
in that court. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962). An authorized and enacted rule
of court has the force of law. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169 (1929). Moreover, the court
has the power to punish attorneys for misbehavior in the practice of law. Ex parte Bradley,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 374 (1868). Violation of a court rule constitutes such misbehavior. The
punishment for violation of a court rule is distinct from punishment for contempt of court.
Id.
17 See note 5 supra.
,1 522 F.2d at 247. The plaintiffs in Bauer recognized the right of courts to protect trials
from prejudice, and therefore, did not attempt to free from restriction comments that actually
would impair a fair trial. Id; see note 4 supra.
" See text accompanying note 11 supra.
522 F.2d at 247.
2' The Bauer court, rather than stating that the Constitution allows a restriction of
speech when it presents a "clear and present danger" to the fair administration of justice,
phrased the test in terms of a "serious and imminent threat" to the fair administration of
justice. While the test is most often stated as "clear and present danger," see note 51 infra,
there is no substantive difference between the labels. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 3-4 (2nd
[Vol. XXXVII
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bench and jury trials.? The court upheld most of the specific proscriptions
contained in DR 7 -10 7 ,2 but held that the proscriptions are effective only
when the serious and imminent threat standard is met.24 The Bauer court
did hold, however, that DR 7-107's proscriptions of speech during civil
trials and during the post-trial period are unconstitutional.2
In Hirschkop, a Virginia attorney contended that DR 7-107T2 was an
unconstitutional violation of his first amendment right to free speech.2
The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's contentions and upheld DR 7-
107's proscriptions when a lawyer's extra-judicial comment presents a rea-
sonable likelihood of prejudice to the impartiality of litigation.? The court
held that the substantial interest of the state and federal judiciary to
guarantee litigants fair trials was an interest that justifies infringement of
an attorney's first amendment free speech guarantee.2 9 The Hirschkop
court, however, held that the restrictions of DR 7-107 were unconstitu-
tional as applied to the criminal post-trial period," to a criminal bench
trial, 31 or to a civil trial.1
2
The Bauer and Hirschkop courts thus differed materially on the ques-
tion whether DR 7-107 employs the correct constitutional balance between
the lawyer's right to free speech and the litigant's right to a fair and
impartial trial. Although both Bauer and Hirschkop agreed that DR 7-107
should not apply to civil trials, the two courts adopted different standards
to determine when DR 7-107's restrictions on free speech are constitu-
ed. tent. draft 1978): Since both tests require the same inquiry, the two labels will be used
interchangeably throughout this note. See id.
2 522 F.2d at 249.
23 See note 9 supra.
21 522 F.2d at 249.
2 522 F.2d at 257-58; see notes 9-10 supra.
28 The Virginia Supreme Court adopted DR 7-107 as a rule of court pursuant to statutory
authority. See VA. CoDE § 54-48 (1978) (Supreme Court may prescribe regulations concerning
a code of ethics governing attorneys' professional conduct); note 16 supra. The version of DR
7-107 adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court is the same as DR 7-107 in the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility. See Rules of Court, 211 Va. 295, 347-50 (1970).
2 594 F.2d at 362. Hirschkop contended that the first amendment precludes any rules
which limit in any way the freedom of speech. Id. at 363; but see Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff conceded that some degree of limitation
on lawyer's first amendment rights is constitutionally permissible).
21 594 F.2d at 362. The Hirschkop court indicated that DR 7-107 was intended by its
drafters to ban comment on enumerated topics absolutely. Id. at 365, 367; see notes 9-10
supra. The court held, however, that there are situations when comment, even on the speci-
fied topics, ought not result in the filing of charges against an attorney. 594 F.2d at 367-68.
Therefore, the court decided that DR 7-107 only prohibits comment that poses a reasonable
likelihood of prejudice to the fair administration of justice. Id. at 362.
2' 594 F.2d at 363-64.
"Id. at 372. In Virginia, the jury, rather than the judge, sometimes imposes the criminal
sentence. When the jury so acts, the Hirschkop court held that the provisions of DR 7-107(E)
must remain in effect. Id.; see note 9 supra.
' Id. at 371-72.
32 Id. at 373.
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tional.1 Additionally, Bauer applied the prohibitions of DR 7-107 to bench
trials, while Hirschkop did not." An examination of these issues is helpful
to the practicing attorney as the basis for understanding his obligations
concerning extra-judicial comment. 5
3 The Bauer court held that DR 7-107 only prohibits statements presenting a serious and
imminent threat of prejudice to the administration of justice. See text accompanying note
24 supra. Hirschkop held that DR 7-107 applies to comments presenting a reasonable likeli-
hood of prejudice. See text accompanying note 28 supra. See generally text accompanying
notes 36-66 infra.
31 Cf. text accompanying notes 25, 30-32 supra.
3 Both Hirschkop and Bauer held that DR 7-107 is not a prior restraint. 594 F.2d at 368-
69; 522 F.2d at 248-49. Though the Supreme Court has never clearly defined what constitutes
a prior restraint, a prior restraint is generally interpreted as a formal prohibition on speech
in advance of the utterance or publication of that speech. Litwach, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 12 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 519, 519-20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Doctrine of
Prior Restraint]. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits' determinations that DR 7-107 is not a
prior restraint of free speech is significant because any first amendment restriction labeled a
prior restraint comes to a court with a heavy presumption of invalidity. Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1976) (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971)). A prior restraint is the most serious and least tolerable infringement of first
amendment rights. Id. at 559. A reviewing court has never sustained a restriction of speech
labeled a prior restraint imposed to protect an accused's sixth amendment rights. L. TRmE,
Am cA CONsTTmoNAL LAW § 12-33 (1978)[hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
There are certain characteristics evident in a prior restraint that are absent from DR 7-
107. A court functions in an adjudicative role when it imposes a prior restraint. In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971). See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 560 (1975); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 539, 544 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Puzzle of Prior Restraint]. Though only valid for a specific, brief period,
a prior restraint prohibits all comment within its ambit. 420 U.S. at 560. A violation of a prior
restraint is summarily punishable as contempt. 594 F.2d at 368; Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
supra at 553. Moreover, the sanction is immediate and irreversible in most cases because,
even if a reviewing court later declares the prior restraint unconstitutional, the contempt
conviction remains valid. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); 522 F.2d
at 248.
In contrast, a court adopting DR 7-107 acts in a legislative rather than in an adjudicative
role. See In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971). DR 7-107 is a broad rule based on
anticipated, rather than actual, facts. Although violation of the rule is punishable as con-
tempt, there is no summary punishment. 594 F.2d at 368. At a full due process hearing one
may challenge the constitutional validity of the restriction and, if successful, will not be guilty
of contempt. 522 F.2d at 248. Moreover, rather than preventing all comment within its ambit,
DR 7-107 only prevents speech which threatens the impartiality of litigation. See Waldo v.
Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782, 790-91 (E.D. La. 1977). This is true even when
the attorney comments on a topic specifically proscribed in DR 7-107.
A reviewing court must avoid the temptation simply to label a restriction of speech a
"prior restraint" and then, without analysis, strike down the restriction as unconstitutional.
Such an approach is of little benefit to the lawyers who must make the decision whether to
speak in a given situation. The same two-step analysis required to determine the correct
constitutional standard to apply to DR 7-107 should apply when a court is reviewing a
restriction of speech that may be a prior restraint. See text accompanying notes 36-66 infra.
The reviewing court's focus of inquiry should be the specific restriction of speech rather
than the label given to that restriction. Otherwise, the protection against unwarranted restric-
tions of free speech not labeled prior restraints will be diminished. Puzzle of Prior Restraint,
supra at 540. Any restriction of free speech, whether labeled or not, inhibits the free exercise
FREE SPEECH-FAIR TRIAL
In determining which standard to apply to proscriptions of speech
under DR 7-107, the reasonable likelihood test or the clear and present
danger test,3 a court must use a two-step analysis. First, the reviewing
court must determine the constitutionally correct label to attach to the
standard determining when the proscriptions of DR 7-107 are in effect.
Second, the court must delineate the inquiry required under the appro-.
priate label. A reviewing court must fully explore both steps to ascertain
whether a particular comment threatens the impartiality of litigation and,
if it does, whether the Constitution allows its proscription.
In Bauer, the Seventh Ciicuit determined that DR 7-107 only prohibits
speech posing a serious and imminent threat to the administraion of jus-
tice.37 The Bauer court stated that this standard gives a lawyer sufficient
notice as to what speech DR 7-107 prohibits, but does not proscribe more
comment than is necessary to prevent prejudice to litigation." The court
in Bauer, however, did not cite Supreme Court authority requiring this
particular label for a constitutionally valid restriction of free speech." Nor
did the court provide a detailed discussion explaining why the reasonable
likelihood label is constitutionally invalid.
The Hirschkop court differed from the Bauer approach in deciding
when the proscriptions of DR 7-107 are in effect. The court first stated that
when drafted, DR 7-107's restrictions were meant to prohibit all comment
on the delineated topics in the rule." The Hirschkop court, however, de-
cided that the prohibitions in DR 7-107 should not apply absolutely.'
According to the Fourth Circuit, there may be an "unusual" instance
where an extra-judicial comment presents no potential for prejudice to the
impartiality of litigation." Therefore, the Hirschkop court stated that DR
7-107's proscriptions apply only when extra-judicial comment presents a
of first amendment rights. Thus, in determining whether a restriction of speech is constitu-
tional, a court should examine the nature of the speech involved, the specific restriction, and
the justification for such a restriction.
", See text accompanying note 33 supra.
37 522 F.2d at 249.
' Id.; see note 5 supra.
3, See 522 F.2d at 249. The Seventh Circuit imposed a clear and present danger label on
the authority of two earlier Seventh Circuit cases holding that such a label is correct to
determine when a valid proscription of first amendment rights exists. Id; see In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970).
The court in Markfield v. Association of the Bar of New York, 49 App. Div. 2d 516, 370
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1975), adopted the clear and present danger label used in Bauer to determine
when the proscriptions of DR 7-107 are in effect. Markfield reviewed a decision admonishing
an attorney for violation of DR 7-107(D) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See
note 9 supra. Noting that the Disciplinary Rule attempts to balance an attorney's right of
free speech with the need to guarantee a fair and impartial trial, the Markfield court held
that the application of DR 7-107 is limited to those situations where the extra-judicial state-
ments present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 49 App. Div. 2d at
517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
,' 594 F.2d at 365, 367; see note 28 supra.
" 594 F.2d at 362.
42 Id. at 368.
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reasonable likelihood of prejudice to a trial's impartiality. 3 The court felt
that this.label was more definite than any other label, thereby providing
the practicing lawyer the best notice of proscribed comment."
The Hirschkop analysis for determining the appropriate label is defi-
cient in two respects. First, the Fourth Circuit defined the instance when
extra-judicial comment does not create prejudice to pending litigation as
unusual, and thus began its analysis with the assumption that extra-
judicial comment is generally prejpdicial to a trial's impartiality. If this
assumption is correct, then DR 7-107 would apply in the average case.
General application of the DR 7-107 proscriptions, however, is constitu-
tionally inadequate due to overbreadth.1" Therefore, DR 7-107's proscrip-
tions of free speech, rather than being appropriate in the average case,
must be reserved for the relatively few cases where extra-judicial com-
ment may result in prejudice."
The second deficiency in the Hirschkop analysis is that the court ap-
plied the reasonable likelihood label simply because the label provides the
practicing attorney the best notice of proscribed comment.47 While notice
of proscription is indeed an issue in determining whether DR 7-107's pros-
criptions are constitutional," it is not the only issue. A reviewing court also
must determine whether the proscription of speech is more extensive than
necessary to protect the impartiality of litigation.49 The Hirschkop court
failed to focus adequately on this overbreadth issue.
13 Id. at 362.
" Id. at 368. The Hirschkop court demonstrated the definiteness of the reasonable likeli-
hood standard with an illustration. If a prosecutor announces to the press that he has a full
confession from the accused, the impartiality of the trial is threatened because the confession
may be inadmissible. A juror may hear of the confession through the newspaper and render
a decision based on the inadmissible confession. The reasonable likelihood standard is thus
met. The potential prejudice to impartiality, however, is not certain. The defendant may
decide not to contest the confession for some reason or the admission may come in over the
defendant's objection. Because of these uncertainties, the clear and present danger test may
not be met.
The Hirschop court thus focused on the uncertainty of future events to determine the
correct constitutional standard for DR 7-107. Because of this uncertainty, the court expressed
doubt that one could determine whether a statement, when first made, could create a clear
and present danger to a trial's impartiality. According to the Hirschkop analysis, too many
unknown variables exist at the time the statement is made to predict the effect of the
statement on the pertinent litigation. The Hirschkop court therefore required only a reasona-
ble likelihood of prejudice for the proscriptions of DR 7-107 to take effect.
" See note 5 supra.
46 In relative terms, the total number of criminal proceedings in which an extra-judicial
statement may create a potential for prejudice is of limited proportions. REARDON REPORT,
supra note 6, at 22. Further, only a small percentage of criminal cases ever reach a jury, most
jury trials do not generate publicity, and much crime news is unnoticed. TuanE, supra note
35, § 12-11.
" See 594 F.2d at 368.
See Note, Trial Publicity - Speech Restrictions Must Be Narrowly Drawn, 54 TEx. L.
Ray. 1158, 1162 (1976).
11 See note 5 supra.
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The Hirschkop court also failed to address Supreme Court precedent
stating when a restriction on the first amendment right to free speech is
constitutionally permissible.5 This precedent includes a long line of deci-
sions holding that restrictions on the freedom of speech are constitutional
only when there is a clear and present danger of evil.' Nor did the
Hirschkop court discuss Supreme Court precedent indicating that a rea-
sonable likelihood label is constitutionally unacceptable." Support for
adoption of the reasonable likelihood label is not very compelling due to
the failure of the Fourth Circuit to discuss and distinguish this precedent.
Although the Bauer court did follow Supreme Court precedent in
adopting the clear and present danger label, the Seventh Circuit failed to
explain the inquiry required under that label to determine when an extra-
judicial comment presents a clear and present danger of prejudice. The
failure to engage in this second step of analysis 3 is highly relevant to the
practicing attorney. It is of little value to know that the restrictions on
0 Neither Hirschkop nor Bauer cited Supreme Court authority for the different labels
adopted. This failure is particularly surprising given the fact that the Supreme Court preced-
ent directly supports the clear and present danger label adopted in Bauer. See note 51 infra.
, The Court first mentioned the clear and present danger test in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In reviewing a conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917, Justice
Holmes stated, "[T]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring alout the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52.
A series of cases in the 1940's reviewing contempt convictions for extra-judicial state-
ments threatening the impartiality of litigation re-affirmed the clear and present danger label
for determining the constitutionality of a restriction on first amendment freedoms. In Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Court reviewed contempt convictions resulting from
out of court statements made by a newspaperman and a litigant during trial. While noting
that defining a correct speech proscription formula is difficult, the Court stated that the clear
and present danger test provides adequate guidance in most situations. Id. at 261-62; see
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 378 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
The Supreme Court continues to hold that there must be a clear and present danger of
evil before the Constitution allows a proscription of free speech. See FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726, 744-45 (1978); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
842-43 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1962).
52 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 371-72, 376 (1947) (comment that poses reasonable
tendency to obstruct justice is not punishable as contempt); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 273 (1941) (reasonable tendency to impair administration of justice is not enough to
justify restriction of free speech).
The court in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973), also
applied the reasonable likelihood label. Younger involved a protective order in a murder case
restraining all participants from publicizing any out of court material. The Younger court
stated that no precedent dictated that either the clear and present danger label or the
reasonable likelihood label was constitutionally correct. The court deemed the clear and
present danger label unworkable because of the unforeseeable future variants at the time the
statement is made. Id. at 161-64, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42. The Younger court therefore
applied the reasonable likelihood label. Id. at 164, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 242. Accord, United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir. 1969).
3 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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extra-judicial speech contained in DR 7-107 apply only when a lawyer's
comment presents a clear and present danger to the fair administration of
justice if the attorney does not know how to determine when a clear and
present danger exists.
As originally stated, the clear and present danger label only required
an examination of the comment in question and the circumstances of the
case.5 No other factors were considered in determining whether a prohibi-
tion of speech was constitutional. This, however, may not be correct under
current application of the clear and present danger label." In 1950, in a
"restaement" of the clear and present danger test adopted by the Su-
preme Court, Judge Learned Hand stated that a reviewing court, in deter-
mining whether a statement presents a clear and present danger of preju-
dice, must ask whether the "gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improb-
ability, justifies such invasion of free speech." 5 Arguably, this
"restatement" requires a balancing of the seriousness of the evil with the
content of the prohibited statement. 5
The requirement of a balancing test under DR 7-107 is supported by
the Supreme Court's recent discussion of the application of the clear and
present danger label.5 In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,5"
the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court, under the clear and present
danger test, must examine the imminence and magnitude of the evil that
would result if the statement is made, and then balance this evil against
the need for free and unfettered expression." Thus, the potential for preju-
See note 51 supra.
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 863 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Strong, Fifty
Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969
Sup. CT. REv. 41.
" United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir. 1950). The defendants in Dennis
were convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring to overthrow the American government
by organizing the Communist Party of the United States. Id. at 205.
57 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 62-68 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing); TRIBE, supra note 35, § 12-11; Puzzle of Prior Restraint, supra note 35, at 540-41.
Is Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). Landmark involved
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute prohibiting the dissemination of information re-
garding proceedings before a review commission authorized to hear complaints about judges'
disability or misconduct. Id. at 831. A newspaper owned by Landmark Communications
published an article accurately describing a pending inquiry by this commission of a named
state judge. Id. This publication resulted in a conviction for the violation of the Virginia
statute. Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 829.
'o Id. at 842-43. The Supreme Court in Landmark Communications did not cite any
authority for the requirement of a balancing analysis under the clear and present danger
label. See id. Rather, the Court cited Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig to explain its balancing
analysis. See id at 844-45; note 51 supra. These cases employed the "old" clear and present
danger test which requires no balancing and focuses exclusively on the utterance and the
particular circumstances of a case. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra. Clearly, these
cases provide no precedent for a balancing analysis under the clear and present danger label.
The decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), subsequent to
Landmark Communications, further complicates the correct analysis required under the clear
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dice resulting from the utterance on one hand, is balanced against the
advantages gained from that utterance, on the other. This balancing in-
quiry makes it probable that a reviewing court considering a restriction
that would be upheld under the original clear and present danger test,6 '
would now declare the same restriction unconstitutional.62
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated, however, that a balancing
inquiry is the only inquiry required under the clear and present danger
label. On the contrary, three different inquiries, all labeled as the clear and
present danger test, have been used in the Court's opinions in the last four
years." The practicing attorney or a reviewing court faces a nearly impossi-
ble task in determining whether an extra-judicial statement presents a
clear and present danger of prejudice to the administration of justice be-
cause the inquiry necessary to make that determination is unclear.64
Nevertheless, the balancing inquiry under the clear and present danger
label represents the most reasonable compromise of the conflict between
the right to free speech and the right to a fair trial. If the advantages of
comment are slight and there is an imminent threat of prejudice to the
trial's impartiality if the comment is made, then the weight of reason
dictates a restriction of free speech. The constitutional right to a fair trial
outweighs the right to speak in such a situation. If, however, there are
compelling reasons for making an extra-judicial statement, a court justifia-
bly may conclude that the right to speak outweighs the danger the speech
and present danger test. Pacifica Foundation, quoting Schenck, see note 51 supra, adopts the
"old" clear and present danger inquiry that requires no balancing at all. The Supreme Court,
within one year, thus announced one inquiry under the clear and present danger label in
Landmark Communications, and a different inquiry under the same label in Pacifica
Foundation.
" See note 51 supra.
62 An illustration is helpful in focusing on the distinction between the Schenck clear and
present danger inquiry and the balancing inquiry that the Supreme Court announced in
Landmark Communications. See note 51 supra; text accompanying note 60 supra. A political
dissident is on trial and there is evidence of an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in prosecuting
the defendant. Evidence of the abuse consists of a statement made by the prosecutor in a
campaign speech prior to trial that he despises those who do not respect American democracy
and that he intends to clear the streets of these "pinkos."
The defendant's attorney could publicize the prosecutor's prior statement and attempt
to portray his client as a "marytr" and thus create public sympathy for the defendant. The
Schenck clear and present danger inquiry proscribes this conduct by the defense attorney
because there is a danger of prejudice to the impartiality of the trial due to the possible
impact of public sympathy. See note 9 supra. When the advantage of publicizing the abuse
of prosecutorial discretion is balanced against the possibility of prejudice, a court may find
that the former outweighs the latter. Thus, there is no clear and present danger of prejudice
under a balancing inquiry.
11 See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 744-45 (1978) (Schenck inquiry); Land-
mark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-43 (1978) (true balancing inquiry);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (arguable balancing inquiry under
the "Hand restatement"); see note 60 supra; text accompanying notes 51 and 57 supra.
64 The inquiry required under the reasonable likelihood label adopted by the Hirschkop
court required no balancing. See 594 F.2d at 368. Hence, neither the Fourth nor Seventh
Circuit used the balancing analysis that the Supreme Court now seems to favor.
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presents to the trial's impartiality. If the extra-judicial comment is made
and prejudices the trial's impartiality, there are remedial devices available
to rectify the situation."5 Hence, a balancing inquiry protects both the right
to a fair trial and the right to free speech with the least amount of first
amendment restriction."6
The ABA's advisory committee, established for the purpose of deter-
mining the proper balance between the right to free speech and the right
to a fair trial, 7 addressed the possibility that distinctions between a jury
and bench trial may warrant the application of DR 7-107 only in jury
trials." The advisory committee, however, decided against such an ap-
proach." The committee felt that even a judge cannot remain totally unaf-
fected by extra-judicial influences. 70 Justification for a restriction of free
speech thus exists, according to the advisory committee, during a bench
trial.7
The Bauer court, adhering to the reasoning used by the advisory com-
mittee, held that there is no distinction between bench and jury trials in
the application of DR 7-107.72 According to the Seventh Circuit, exposing
a judge to as little extra-judicial information as possible obviates the need
for the judge to remove large amounts of material from his judicial thought
process.73 The court also said that preventing the judge from hearing extra-
judicial comment removes any appearance that the decision was based on
improper evidence.74 Therefore, the Bauer court declared that preventing
prejudicial publicity from reaching a judge during a bench trial is desira-
ble.75
The Hirschkop court, rejecting the approach of both the ABA's advi-
sory committee and the Bauer court, held that bench and jury trials are
distinguishable with respect to DR 7-107.78 The Hirschkop court felt that
Is The Supreme Court endorses the use of remedial devices to protect the right to a fair
trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966). These devices include change of
venue, extensive voir dire of jurors, sequestration of jurors, mistrial, jury instructions, and
reversal on appeal. Id.
,1 If a reviewing court determines that the right to a fair trial and the right to free speech
are equally compelling in a given situation, then the latter right must be restricted in favor
of the former. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) ("trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused"); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (right to fair trial is the "most fundamental of all freedoms"
and must be maintained "at all costs").
11 See note 7 supra.
13 REARDON REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
11 Cf. note 9 supra.
70 REARDON REPORT, supra note 6, at 53. A judge is constantly exposed to an extra-judicial
influence when ruling on the admissibility of evidence. If deemed inadmissible, the judge
must not consider this extra-judicial influence in rendering a decision.
71 Id.




11 594 F.2d at 371-72.
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the interests protected through prohibition of comment in jury trials were
not as compelling during a bench trial." The Fourth Circuit held that a
lawyer's extra-judicial comments are no more prejudicial than the other
inadmissible evidence to which a judge is constantly exposed during trial.7 8
The Hirschkop court thus concluded that, because of the minimal gain to
impartiality and the substantial impairment of first amendment rights,
DR 7-107 should not apply to a bench trial."
The Hirschkop court's decision not to apply DR 7-107 to bench trials
is constitutionally correct. A judge must continually hear material that is
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Unlike jurors, the judge is trained
in the law. A judge must render decisions based solely on admissible evi-
dence. Because the probability of prejudice is slight, there is no clear and
present danger of prejudice from extra-judicial statements during a
bench trial. This minimum potential for prejudice does not constitution-
ally warrant the substantial impairment of the lawyer's first amendment
rights resulting from the application of DR 7-107 during bench trials.0
" Id. at 372.
7" Id. at 371.
,' Id. Basic to the distinction between a bench and jury trial in the application of DR 7-
107 is the assumption that prejudicial publicity does, in fact, influence a jury's deliberations
and findings. The empirical data that exists on the effect of publicity on a jury is not extensive
or conclusive. Compare REARDON REPORT, supra note 6, at 65-67 and Schmidt, Nebraska Press
Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. Rxv. 431, 449-
50 (1977) (prejudicial publicity does have an adverse impact on jurors) with Simon, Does
the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact
on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 515 (1977) (prejudicial publicity may not have
an adverse impact on jurors in some situations).
" Several Supreme Court cases have'reversed contempt convictions for extra-judicial
statements allegedly resulting in the coercion and intimidation of a judge during a bench
trial. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 378
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349-50 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 278 (1941). In these cases, the danger to a fair trial did not exist because the Supreme
Court credited the judiciary in general, and these judges in particular, with the intestinal
fortitude to withstand verbal attack. See Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 161-62, 106
Cal. Rptr. 225, 241 (1973). Further, several Supreme Court opinions indicate that there is not
a clear and present danger of prejudice from extra-judicial statements during a bench trial.
See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (injury to the
official or institutional reputation of courts, is insufficient to prohibit free speech); Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946) (external standards of any type cannot depend on
the varying degrees of "moral courage or stability" different judges possess in different situa-
tions). See also TRmE, supra note 35, § 12-11; Note, The Attorney "No-Comment" Rules and.
the First Amendment, 21 Aiuz. L. REv. 61, 64 (1979).
If a particular comment results in prejudice in a bench trial, remedial measures are
available to guarantee the accused an impartial trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
363 (1966); note 65 supra. For example, a new trial is always available whenever prejudice
results from an extra-judicial statement during a bench trial. Id.
The same analysis that prohibits the application of DR 7-107 during bench trials also
applies when there is a sequestered jury. Sequestration isolates the jury from the threat of
prejudice caused by extra-judicial statement. Therefore, because little chance of a threat to
impartiality exists, there is no need for a first amendment restriction. Nevertheless, those
1980]
232 WASHINGTON AND LEE -LAW REVIEW
Both the Hirschkop and Bauer courts held DR 7-107's prohibition of
comment during either a bench or jury civil trial unconstitutional.8' The
Bauer court stated that the invocation of the phrase "fair trial" does not
as readily justify a restriction of speech when referring to a civil, as opposed
to a criminal, trial.8" Both courts stressed the fact that civil litigation is
often much longer than criminal litigation, so that the restrictions on
speech would be effective for a longer period of time.1 Further, according
to these courts, civil litigation often involves important social issues, and
therefore, a restriction on the speech of a lawyer silences a voice that could
be instrumental in informing the public about those issues.84
The Hirschkop and Bauer decisions not to atply DR 7-107 to civil trials
because of a reluctance to silence socially beneficial comment are unjusti-
fied. If a reviewing court, using the constitutionally required clear and
present danger test,u does not use a balancing analysis, then any compel-
ling advantages society gains in allowing lawyers to speak when the litiga-
tion concerns a matter of social interest are irrelevant. 6 If a court is using
a balancing inquiry, the possible prejudice from an extra-judicial state-
ment is balanced against the advantages resulting from the making of the
statement to determine which interest is most compelling in a given situa-
tion.87 The social benefits of making a particular statement thus are given
due consideration. Hence, under either the original clear and present dan-
ger inquiry or the balancing inquiry, there is no valid reason not to apply
DR 7-107 to civil trials.88
parts of DR 7-107 pertaining to litigation before the time of the sequestration remain applica-
ble. See notes 9-10 supra.
1, 594 F.2d at 373; 522 F.2d at 257-59. Although the Reardon Report, supra note 6, did
not specifically recommend prohibition of comment during civil trials, a provision providing
such a prohibition was nevertheless included in DR 7-107. See note 10 supra.
12 522 F.2d at 257.
13 594 F.2d at 373; 522 F.2d at 257.
" 594 F.2d at 373; 522 F.2d at 258. The recent litigation concerning A.H. Robbins Co.'s
"Dalkon Shield" intrauterine contraceptive device is an example of the "social" civil litiga-
tion referred to by the Bauer and Hirschkop courts. Society has an interest in the safety of
such contraceptive devices and a lawyer involved in this type litigation very well could offer
insights unavailable from any other source.
" See text accompanying notes 36-66 supra.
" If there is no balancing under the clear and present danger label, a reviewing court
focuses solely on the extra-judicial statement, and the possibility that the statement will
impair a trial's impartiality. The advantages resulting from the statement are not considered.
Further, it is also irrelevant that civil litigation may last longer than criminal. See text
accompanying note 83 supra. A restriction of speech that lasts for a long period of time is
indeed a negative factor resulting from DR 7-107's application during a civil trial. However,
a weighing of advantages and disadvantages does not occur under the original, non-balancing,
clear and present danger label. See notes 51 and 62 supra.
'" See text accompanying note 60 supra. In addition to considering the social benefits of
an extra-judicial comment, a reviewing court using the balancing inquiry would also consider
the length of time a proscription of speech would be effective if DR 7-107 applies to civil trials.
See note 86 supra. The length of time, if extensive, would be a factor weighing against such
an application of DR 7-107.
" The Hirschkop and Bauer courts did not apply DR 7-107 to civil trials because of a
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The Fourth Circuit in Hirschkop stated that the existing empirical
evidence indicating the possibility or extent of prejudice on civil litigation
resulting from a lawyer's extra-judicial comments does not warrant the
first amendment restrictions in DR 7-107.11 Neither Hirschkop nor Bauer
hesitated to apply DR 7-107 to a criminal proceeding, however, even
though existing evidence does not conclusively establish that an extra-
judicial statement in such a trial prejudices a jury." Indeed, an extra-
'judicial statement could influence a jury in a civil trial to the same extent
such a statement influences a jury in a criminal trial. Thus, the dearth of
evidence on the effect of an extra-judicial statement on a civil proceeding
may be the result of a simple lack of investigation in this area."
Our judicial system guarantees a civil litigant an impartial trial.2 The
proscription of extra-judicial comment that presents a clear and present
danger to this impartiality is constitutionally legitimate. A reviewing
court, assuming a balancing analysis is correct under the clear and present
danger label, will give the advantages of extra-judicial comment during
civil trials ample consideration. Because both the advantages of comment
and the litigant's right to a fair trial are adequately considered, the judicial
reluctance to proscribe socially beneficial comment by a lawyer. The Supreme Court has
rejected this type of reasoning. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), the Court addressed
an argument that more extra-judicial comments are permissible during civil litigation be-
cause the pending case may possibly involve a matter of public concern. Id. at 378. The Court
responded that the nature of the case is a factor to consider in determining whether there is
a clear and present danger of prejudice. Id. However, the rule prohibiting extra-judicial
comment from interferring with the fair administration of justice is fashioned to serve the
needs of all litigation. Id. Hence, the mere fact that a case is civil in nature does not remove
it from the scope of DR 7-107.
" 594 F.2d at 373.
H See note 79 supra.
" An extra-judicial statement clearly can have an adverse effect on a civil trial in some
instances. See In re Porter, 268 Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345 (1974). Porter involved the review of a
reprimand given a lawyer for extra-judicial statements he made concerning a civil proceeding
which violated DR 7-107. 268 Or. at -, 521 P.2d at 346; see note 10 supra. The court
upheld the reprimand because the statements tended to prevent a fair trial. 268 Or. at ,
521 P.2d at 349.
The court in Porter refused to apply the original clear and present danger test to deter-
mine whether a lawyer's extra-judicial statements violate DR 7-107. Id.; see note 51 supra.
The Porter court held that the Supreme Court cases using the original clear and present
danger test did not involve disciplinary action against lawyers, and therefore were of no
precedential value in ruling on a violation of DR 7-107. 268 Or. at -, 521 P.2d at 349.
Such a distinction is unwarranted because the standard used to determine a constitutionally
permissible infringement of first amendment rights is the same regardless of the speaker's
occupation. Of course, the involvement of a lawyer injects different considerations into the
clear and present danger inquiry because the right to a fair and impartial trial competes
against the lawyer's first amendment rights. The same analysis, however, applies. The clear
and present danger standard is applicable in any situation involving an infringement of the
freedom of speech.
,1 The Supreme Court has stated that freedom of discussion, although important, should
not divert a trial from the adjudication of both criminal and civil controversies in the calm-
ness and solemnity of the courtroom. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1966).
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process should assure the civil litigant the fair trial protection embodied
in DR 7-107.11
Disciplinary Rule 7-107 is a noteworthy, but inadequate attempt to
balance the litigant's right to a fair trial and the lawyer's right to free
speech." The Hirschkop and Bauer opinions also fail to give these rights
of free speech and a fair trial maximum protection. Yet, each court im-
proves the protections presently embodied in DR 7-107. The ABA should
incorporate these improvements into DR 7-107 to insure that the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and fair trial are served fully. 5
W. JEFFERY EDWARDS
'3 When the civil trial is before a judge rather than a jury there is no reason to apply DR
7-107. See text accompanying notes 67-80 supra.
An issue that neither the Bauer nor Hirschkop courts addressed is whether DR 7-107
should apply to defense counsel during criminal trials. The Reardon Report, while recognizing
that a defense counsel's statement infrequently creates a potential for prejudice to a criminal
trial, nevertheless felt the relative likelihood of prejudice significant enough to warrant DR
7-107's application to defense counsel. REARDON REPORT, supra note 6, at 37.
The argument that DR 7-107 should not apply to defense counsel in criminal proceedings
emphasizes the fact that the state, through the prosecutor, must meet the requirements of
due process. Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defen-
dants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REv. 607, 617
(1977). The defense attorney is not subject to this constitutional requirement. If the prohibi-
tions of DR 7-107 protect the accused's sixth amendment rights, then the defendant, through
his attorney, should be able to waive those protections. Id. The basis of the argument is that
the Constitution protects the individual from the state, not the state from the individual. Id.
at 607.
The argument against the application of DR 7-107 to defense attorneys operates from an
incorrect assumption. While the prohibitions of DR 7-107 are primarily for the benefit of the
accused, there is no way to waive these protections without injuring the judicial system itself.
If the defense attorney takes his case to the newspapers, he is not waiving DR 7-107's protec-
tions. Instead, he is creating an unfair advantage for his client. The defense would be able to
utilize the press to their advantage knowing that the prosecution could not make use of this
extra-judicial channel. Neither the Constitution nor the courts will allow a shift in the settle-
ment of controversies from the courtroom to the newspapers. See generally United States v.
Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 667 (10th Cir. 1969); State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, -, 204 A.2d
841, 852 (1964).
11 The President of the ABA has charged an ABA special commission with the task of
studying and revising the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The working draft, which
does not yet represent the commission's collective viewpoint, changes DR 7-107 in two sub-
stantial ways. See ABA COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4a (working draft, August 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
RULEs].
First, the draft clearly states that the prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rule apply only
when there is a serious and imminent risk of prejudice to a trial. Id. This change clearly states
the label of the standard that guides the application of DR 7-107. No effort is made in the
draft, however, to identify clearly the inquiry which the serious and imminent threat label
requires. Id. See generally text accompanying notes 36-66 supra.
Second, the draft of DR 7-107 only prohibits an attorney's extra-judicial statements
during a jury trial. MODEL RULES 3.4a. The Constitution certainly warrants this limitation.
See generally text accompanying notes 67-80 supra.
11 The problem of extra-judicial statements threatening the impartiality of trials is not
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moot or inconsequential. Stephen Lesher, a veteran reporter, has started a public relations
firm whose clients are, for the most part, lawyers. Kierman, Lawyers: Image Makers Join
Legal Profession, The Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1979, at C-1, col. 1. Lesher says that the
judicial system is "ultimately political" and should be "used." Id. at C-3, col. 1. "It's like
show business. Always leave them laughing. Give them what they want." Id. at C-1, col. 1.
Lesher claims there is no attempt to influence judges or juries. Id. However, one Washington
lawyer says that lately it seems that the trial of some cases is "before the court of public
opinion." Id.
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